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Introduction
This special issue commemorates the fiftieth anniversary of the Journal of Common
Market Studies. Over five decades, the journal has charted the deep transformations
wrought by integration in Europe: of markets and economic organization; law and courts;
party systems and interest group politics; and of regulation, both public and private. Along
the way, scholarship on the EC/EU gradually turned to the pervasive impact of integration
and supranational governance on national structures; to how the various levels of decision
making interact to produce and implement policy; and to public opinion, cultural identity
and the deep normative questions concerning how to assess the political legitimacy of the
EU. Once catering to a relatively small community of specialists, there is now virtually no
important strain of social scientific, legal or historical research on contemporary Europe
that falls outside the journal’s purview. Arguably, JCMS is the most important and
successful interdisciplinary forum for the publication of research on any single polity – in
this case, the European Union.
Although much has changed, major themes developed in this special issue found
expression in the early journal. The first twenty issues (1962–1967) contained articles on
voting procedures (Sidjanski, 1962), the state of public opinion on the European Com-
munity (Gallup, 1963); the concept and practice of ‘supranational’ authority (Rosenstiel,
1963; Deutsch, 1963); and supposed distinctions between the process of ‘functional
integration’ and that of federalization (Mitrany 1965). One finds articles examining a
‘constitutional crisis’ (Lambert, 1966) and a ‘crisis of national identity’ (Kitzinger, 1967),
an attempt to ‘model’ the EC as a ‘political system’ (Lindberg, 1967) and assessments of
the outlook for monetary integration (Triffin, 1965; Gonzalez del Valle, 1966). The lead
article published in the first issue of Volume 1 was dedicated to the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) (McMahon, 1962), followed by one on the ‘nature and functioning’ of the
preliminary reference system (Berrios Martinez, 1966). The journal also devoted substan-
tial space to scholarship on regional integration elsewhere: in Latin America (Griffin
and Ffrench-Davis, 1965; Navarrete, 1965), Asia (Stonham, 1967) and the Arab World
(Diab, 1966).
For this special issue, we commissioned an eclectic mix of articles that would reflect
some of the rich diversity (substantive, theoretical, methodological) that today character-
izes the study of European integration. We encouraged contributors to develop topics of
broad empirical interest, to assess the evolution of the relevant scholarship and to extend
analysis, as far as possible, across the life of the EC/EU. Although the articles focus on
Europe, we recognize and celebrate the journal’s pioneering role as a promoter of research
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on comparative regional integration (CRI). We have therefore devoted a substantial part of
this introduction to comparative issues, and we asked contributors, where appropriate, to
consider their findings in light of experiments in regional integration beyond Europe.
We made no attempt to set theoretical or methodological priorities, or to cover even the
most important sub-fields that comprise the journal’s now extensive dominion. While
offering a multiplicity of perspectives, the contributions to this issue nonetheless share
some important dispositions. The first is a view of European integration as a dynamic
process that chronically generates new dilemmas of governance as solutions to prior
problems are consolidated as stable institutions and practices. The regime has developed
not so much by design, from some specified ex ante moment, but by bricolage, ex post.
The various macro-processes that make up integration – economic, legislative and regu-
latory, judicial, socio-cultural and so on – have been shaped, on a piecemeal basis, by a
wide range of actors taking decisions in different arenas at different times. The expansive
dynamics of European integration have not been replicated on other continents. Regional
experiments elsewhere have been far more constrained, both by treaty design and by the
vigilant application of state power. We will consider the European case in its comparative
context in the next section.
Although our contributors conceive integration, in part, as that set of interconnected
processes through which the EU polity has been constructed, defining what the EU is – as
a polity – is not the primary focus of their attention. JCMS, of course, has long been the
site of a vigorous debate about the nature of the EC/EU, as it has evolved in complexity
and form. In a famous article on blind men and elephants, Puchala (1971) demonstrated
that the EC could be described in radically dissimilar ways, depending upon what aspect
of the system was being analyzed from what standpoint. The regime has been conceptu-
alized, among other ways, as: a system of ‘multi-level governance’ (Marks et al., 1996);
an intergovernmental cartel dominated by heads of governments and state interests
(Moravcsik, 1993); a repository of supranational authority that not only governs, but helps
to determine state preferences (Sandholtz, 1996); an amalgam of different forms of the
nation-state (Caporaso, 1996); and as a type of federal polity to be compared with other
federal states (Von Krosigk, 1970; Swendon, 2004). As discussed further in the second
part of this introduction, this debate lurks in the background of many of this issue’s
contributions (De Wilde and Zürn, Fligstein et al., Mény) but it does not drive the analysis.
Instead, the articles in this issue are heavily informed by theory and method developed
in research on general questions of importance. Héritier examines how legislative
decision-rules have changed over time, with what effect, in light of generic theories of
institutional change. Kelemen mixes models of judicialization and delegation to explain
and evaluate the enormous authority the ECJ has accrued. Rittberger shows that the steady
empowerment of the European Parliament is embedded in the history and social logics of
the parliamentary model itself. And Hobolt treats public opinion as a crucial indicator of
the European polity’s legitimacy, using the same concepts and methods that her field
would use to assess the legitimacy of national regimes.
We could go on, but the point has been made. Our understanding of the EU, however
sui generis its history, form and functioning, does not depend on the development of sui
generis materials. On the contrary, the most important advances in the field have been
made by scholars who are directly engaged with broader disciplinary projects. This
special issue provides not only a survey of some of the most important research currently
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being undertaken on European integration, but it also indicates how important EU phe-
nomena have become for the application and refinement of concepts, theory and methods
in a wide range of disciplines.
The rest of this introduction takes up these points in some detail. In the next part, we
consider regional integration in light of three approaches to CRI: neofunctionalism,
externality theory and incomplete contracting. A renaissance of the field of CRI is
currently underway, and a coherent theory of regional integration, based on the main
elements of these approaches, is rapidly emerging. In Europe, integration has produced a
polity that scholars now study more or less as they would the national systems that belong
to the EU. This momentous outcome weighs heavily on the articles presented here:
contributors treat the EU more as an autonomous, quasi-federal political system than as an
international organization, and most evaluate the evolution of the EU in light of the
shrinking capacities of the Member States to govern autonomously.
In Part II, we provide an overview of the special issue, focusing on two linked issues.
The first concerns institutional change – that is, the process through which EU compe-
tences and procedures for decision making have evolved over time (Craig, Héritier,
Kelemen, Rittberger and Eichengreen). The second concerns political legitimacy and
contestation. As the domain of supranational governance has widened and deepened, as
the EU has developed features that are recognizably ‘state-like’, challenges to the EU’s
political legitimacy have become a ‘normal’ part of European politics (De Wilde and Zürn,
Fligstein et al., Hobolt, Mény, Rittberger).
I. Regional Integration in Comparative Perspective
Integration theory is as relevant today as it was when JCMS was founded. One set of
reasons is empirical: virtually every region of the globe is experimenting with new
arrangements or reforming existing regimes. Economic globalization is, in large measure,
channelled through and registered on regions (Kim and Shin, 2002). Regional integration
also raises an important theoretical challenge: how do we explain variation in the design
of regional regimes and the outcomes that they have produced? Some integration schemes
fail to attain most or any of their objectives, while others are highly successful. In this
section, we reflect on these issues by reviewing the main approaches to CRI.
The EU comprises only one case of regional integration, to be understood compara-
tively. It is of special importance, however, since extensive research on its evolution has
generated concepts, hypotheses and methods that presumptively apply to all regional
arrangements. The classic questions of European integration, after all, are at the core of
CRI. Can integration succeed if states do not confer significant authority to supranational
organs, provide for strong monitoring and dispute resolution procedures, or agree to give
up their veto by renouncing unanimity decision-rules? Does the mix of intergovernmental
and supranational modes of governance change over time, or vary across policy areas, and
why? Which actors and processes are crucial to producing the ‘demand’ for integration,
and how and to what extent does the regime respond? Whereas European integration
theory provides some candidate responses to these questions, it is also true that CRI helps
to illuminate the distinctive features of the EU case.
Three main approaches to CRI stand out: neofunctionalism, externality theory and
contracting theory. Each has been developed, in part, through research on European
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integration. The three frameworks overlap one another in important ways; indeed, the
most sophisticated theories of European integration have self-consciously combined
materials from each approach, at least since the 1990s. We treat them separately here in
order to focus attention on the specific arguments to which each gives pride of place.
Neofunctionalism
Ernst Haas, of course, is the most influential early theorist of CRI. Although primarily
interested in understanding European developments, he insisted that his ultimate concern
was ‘not [to uncover] the uniqueness of this or that region, but with investigating the
generality of the integration process’ (Haas and Schmitter, 1964). Rising interdependence
(especially economic transactions across borders) in a region creates pressure for integra-
tion. If and how this demand is actually met, however, is conditioned by three variables
which, taken together, explain variation in the intensity of integration: social and political
pluralism; symmetrical regional heterogeneity; and bureaucratized decision making
coupled with supranational agency. The measure of each of these factors can be high or
low: a high value will facilitate integration, a low value will render success less likely.
By high social and political pluralism, Haas meant the full mobilization of society via
interest groups and political parties, and elites competing for political survival and domi-
nance under rules of constitutional democracy. Integration proceeds most rapidly when it
responds to socio-economic demands emanating from a pluralistic industrial-urban
environment.
Because the modern ‘industrial–political’ actor fears that his way of life cannot be
safeguarded without structural adaptation, he turns to integration; but by the same token,
political actors who are neither industrial, nor urban, nor modern in their outlook usually
do not favour this kind of adaptation, for they seek refuge instead in national exclusive-
ness. (Haas, 1961, p. 375)
Symmetrical heterogeneity is high if the structure of pluralism among states in the region
is similar – that is, classes, political parties and organized interests have counterparts in
other states with which they can pursue common cause. Haas hypothesized that sym-
metrical pluralism in a region would be ‘of far greater importance in explaining . . . the
success [of integration]’ than would be ‘linguistic, cultural or religious unity’ (Haas, 1967,
pp. 319–20).
Highly bureaucratized decision making renders more efficient the interactions among
national civil services engaged in policy-co-ordination. Further, to the extent that trea-
ties confer authority on supranational agents to propose and make policy, monitor com-
pliance with agreements and resolve disputes, bureaucratic capacity will also be built at
the regional level. National officials will come to rely on experts above the state to
mediate among them, to ‘construct patterns of mutual concessions from various policy
contexts’ (Haas, 1968, p. 152), and to ‘upgrad[e] common interests’ (Haas, 1961, p.
377). To the extent that these predictions hold true, market and political actors are likely
to shift some part of their ‘loyalties, expectations, and political activities toward a new
and expanding centre, whose organs possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-
existing national states’ (Haas, 1968, p. 5).
With remarkable accuracy, Haas predicted varying outcomes of integration, including
failure in Latin America during the 1960s (Haas, 1968). Socio-political pluralism was not
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a given in most of Latin America, where paternalism, authoritarianism and other forms of
socio-economic traditionalism hindered the mobilization of interest groups and political
parties (Haas and Schmitter, 1964, p. 722). Symmetrical heterogeneity, too, was weak.
Industrialists, political parties and trade unionists in one country did not readily establish
relationships with their counterparts elsewhere. Decision making in Latin America was
also more politicized. Battles between socialism and capitalism, working class and aris-
tocracy, the military and civilian, and church and state continued to rage, leaving the
formation of a cadre of dispassionate and pragmatic bureaucrats – the tecnicos – unlikely.
Finally, the lack of any meaningful autonomy for supranational agents further limited
chances of success. For similar reasons, Haas was also deeply sceptical about the pros-
pects of integration in other regions, including among Arab states (Haas, 1961, pp.
380–82).
One distinguishing feature of neofunctionalism worth highlighting, relative to other
approaches to CRI, is its concern with the evolutionary dynamics of integration. Under
certain conditions, the argument goes, an inherently expansionary process of integration
would be sustained (Haas, 1961). Integration would occur to the extent that: (a) transna-
tional activity and economic interdependence proceeds, revealing both potential to reap
joint gains and to deal with the negative externalities created by transnational activity; (b)
elites (private actors, firms and public officials) are led to seek regional – rather than
national – solutions to shared problems; and (c) regional organs supply governance (in the
form of market regulation, procedures for the ongoing production of law and dispute
resolution) that satisfied these needs. Haas famously predicted that, through mechanisms
of positive feedback among these elements, integration would beget integration, an
outcome that he called ‘spillover’. The achievement of integration in one policy sector
typically produces pressure to integrate in related sectors.1
In the 1990s, neofunctionalism was revived, modified and subjected to relatively
systematic testing (Burley and Mattli, 1993; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 1998). This
research has demonstrated that Haasian feedback loops and other forms of spillover have
been the basic mechanisms of integration across the history of the EU. Most important,
progress in ‘negative integration’ (the removal of national barriers to exchange across
borders) was shown to be causally connected to ‘positive integration’ (the supply of EU
regulations). The most comprehensive account (Fligstein and Stone Sweet, 2002) dem-
onstrated that the activities of market actors, lobbyists, legislators, litigators and judges
became connected to one another in specific ways. These linkages constituted a self-
reinforcing causal system that has given the EU its fundamentally expansionary features.
A wealth of detailed case studies also documented the various forms that spillover takes,
across a range of policy areas.
As important, the field was enriched by innovative research that was compatible with,
or contributed to, the development of neofunctionalism. These include influential studies
on delegation to supranational organs (Pollack, 2003), the historical dynamics of integra-
1 The intergovernmentalism of Garrett (1992) and Moravcsik (1998) also focused on the externalities of economic
interdependence, and they drew from theories of contracting, delegation and commitment. Neofunctionalism differs from
these theories on theoretical grounds (how axioms are derived). Intergovernmentalists deny the causal importance on
integration of the development of transnational linkages and society, and downplay the capacity of supranational organi-
zations to generate outcomes not desired by the dominant states. The theory predicts that the course of integration will be
tightly constrained by national interests and intergovernmental bargaining, and that significant ‘unintended consequences’
(for governments) are never produced. These claims, in our view, have been refuted by the evidence.
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tion (Pierson, 1996) and the role of culture and ideas in political projects of market
building (Fligstein and Mara-Drita, 1996). Early neofunctionalism also provided several
of the key ideas and elements that later approaches to CRI – in particular externality
theory and contracting theory – would develop more fully. Haas understood the crucial
role that the externalities of economic interdependence play in creating demand for
integration. He even noted that the impulse to integrate, even in Latin America and the
Arab World, might be triggered by common external threats – an insight he did not attempt
to fully theorize (Haas, 1961, p. 382). Externality theory, among other things, tackles this
issue head-on.
Externality Theory
The externality theory of CRI proposed by Mattli (1999) bears some resemblance to the
framework proposed by Haas, most clearly in its emphasis on the analytical primacy of
sub- and supranational actors. Central to the theory is the concept of cross-border exter-
nalities. Different types of externalities have varying impacts on the incentives of eco-
nomic and political actors to pursue integration. The concept also incorporates, within a
single framework, the internal and external logics of integration. The internal logic
elaborates the conditions under which integration succeeds or fails; the external logic
explicates the conditions under which integration may trigger integrative responses in
outsider countries.
The internal logic suggests that two conditions must be satisfied if integration is to
succeed – namely demand-side and supply-side conditions. The demand by economic
actors (importers, exporters, transnational investors, etc.) for regional rules, regulations
and policies depends on the frequency and riskiness of cross-border transactions. Exter-
nalities affecting cross-border trade and investment arise from economic and political
uncertainty as well as financial hazards that market actors may face when dealing with
multiple polities and markets in a region. The costs of these externalities rise as new
technologies raise the potential for gains from cross-border market exchange, thus
increasing the payoffs to regional rules, regulations and policies that alleviate these costs.
Demand by market actors, however, is never enough. Supply conditions, under which
political leaders are willing and able to accommodate demands for integration, need to be
satisfied too. Leaders may not see the need to pursue deeper integration if expected
marginal gains from further integration are minimal, given the cost in terms of forgone
autonomy. The payoff of integration to political leaders is, therefore, crucial.
Even willing political leaders may be unable to overcome collective action problems.
Co-ordination problems are particularly salient in integration because most regional
integration schemes, including free-trade areas, customs unions or economic unions, go
beyond negative integration. The move to positive integration – the development of
regional market regulations and other policies – chronically raises distributional issues
because any chosen course of action will typically benefit some states within the group
more than others (in the EU, see Scharpf, 1988; Moravcsik, 1993). The questions of
equitable distribution of the gains from co-operation will need to be addressed to prevent
discontent from derailing the integration process. The presence of an undisputed leader –
a benevolent hegemon – can serve as a focal point for policy co-ordination, and can ease
distributional tensions through acting as ‘paymaster’. In sum, regimes that satisfy both the
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demand and supply conditions stand the greatest chance of succeeding (for example, EU,
Zollverein, North American Free Trade Agreement or ‘NAFTA’), whereas groups that
fulfill neither set of conditions are least likely to attain any significant level of integration
(for example, Latin American Free Trade Association or ‘LAFTA’, Economic Community
of West African States, Arab Common Market); and regions satisfying one but not the
other condition show mixed records – some successes but many setbacks (Asia Pacific
Economic Co-operation Forum).
Recent studies have applied the theory further. Bouzas and Soltz (2001), for example,
have assessed the evolving performance of MERCOSUR in terms of changing parameters
of demand and supply; and Krapohl et al. (2010) have examined the relative significance
of demand and supply factors in a comparative analysis of NAFTA and MERCOSUR.
Other scholars have pointed to a limitation of the framework – namely the narrow
conception of leadership as that provided by the dominant country. Laursen (2010) and
Tallberg (2006), for example, have stressed – as neofunctionalists do – that supranational
institutions can also fulfill the same role, providing policy innovation and reducing
policy-based disputes among member states. Further research designed to specify more
fully the different mechanisms for overcoming co-ordination dilemmas is needed.
Externality theory complements the internal logic of integration with an account of the
external logic, focusing on the effects of regional integration on outsider countries notably
in terms of trade and investment diversions. On the crucial issue of how outsiders will
react to these externalities, the theory suggests that countries negatively affected by
regional integration will pursue one of two strategies. First, they can seek to merge with
the group generating the external effects, which is possible only if the existing group is
willing to accept newcomers. If the candidate is unlikely to make a net contribution to the
union, the union is unlikely to accept it. The union may nonetheless have an interest in
accepting an otherwise ‘undesirable’ candidate when negative externalities originating in
an outsider country threatens to disrupt the union’s prosperity, stability or security. A
dismal economic situation in an outsider country may raise the specter of large-scale
migration to the more prosperous union, thus threatening social and political stability. The
union may be better off integrating an ‘undesirable’ outsider in order to invigorate
industrial production and employment in the outsider’s economy, thereby easing migra-
tory pressure. Following the collapse of communism, the EU offered integration to
Central and Eastern European countries, partly for such reasons (Mattli, 1999, pp. 95–9;
Schneider, 2009).
Second, if joining the existing regional regime is undesirable or proves impossible, a
state may opt to forge a new regional arrangement. The establishment of the EC provoked
numerous integration projects – most notably the European Free Trade Association
(EFTA) and LAFTA. Likewise, efforts to deepen integration through the Single European
Act raised fears of a ‘Fortress Europe’, provoking a veritable tidal wave of integration
projects throughout the world in the late 1980s. Counter-unions, too, must satisfy both
demand and supply conditions to be successful.
Externality theory is primarily geared toward explaining, in simple ‘comparative
statics’ terms, why some integration schemes succeed and other fail, and how successful
schemes interact with outsider states to structure subsequent attempts at integration. It
does not attempt to explain how any governance within a specific regime will evolve over
time.
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Contracting Theory
A third approach focuses on some of the consequences of institutional design, ex ante,
on the course of regional integration, ex post. Incomplete contracting will produce a
treaty that sets general priorities and objectives for the regime, while leaving many key
provisions, such as those specifying the means of achieving the treaty’s purposes, rela-
tively open-ended. The more incomplete a regional treaty, the more it will be subject to
continuous gap-filling, as well as formal revision, if integration is to proceed. In con-
trast, a treaty drafted to obtain as much completeness as possible will be comprised of
detailed, even fully specified, provisions. To the extent that adaptation is required, it will
occur through the same kind of inter-state bargaining that gave birth to the original
treaty.
The EU and NAFTA embody this contrast. The Treaty of Rome of 1957, the EU’s
foundational agreement, is a classic example of an incomplete contract. The text is brief
and short on details; its scope, however, is wide. The Treaty also creates the Commission
and ECJ, whose decisions in crucial areas are insulated from reversal by the member
states, except by treaty revision under a unanimity rule. The implication is that the contract
will be ‘completed’ over time and in light of changing circumstances, through the activi-
ties of supranational organs, interacting with affected interests and governments. For
example, the ECJ’s impact on market, political and legal integration has been extensive,
profound and largely unanticipated by the contracting states (literature surveyed in Stone
Sweet (2010); see also Kelemen and Craig in this issue). Alternatively, the NAFTA
agreement shows all the hallmarks of a relatively complete contract (Abbott, 2000). It is
thousands of pages in length, and highly detailed. Yet its aim is limited to establishing a
free trade area. Tellingly, NAFTA does not provide for the equivalent of a Commission or
ECJ. Instead, it is a regional integration scheme whose central mode of governance is
intergovernmental.
What explains these differences? Cooley and Spruyt (2009), who have offered the most
sustained application of contracting theory to CRI, emphasize two variables: relative
(a)symmetries in power and the demand for integration, among regional states. In
NAFTA, the distribution of power is highly asymmetric. The United States occupies a
hegemonic position, its economy accounting for about 85 per cent of the NAFTA region.
For Cooley and Spruyt, a hegemon poses foreseeable risks for small states, like Canada
and Mexico. If elements of the contract are left unspecified, the United States might be
tempted to use its power to obtain advantage in future changes to the agreement. A
relatively complete contract serves as protection against such risks, leaving residual rights
of control (to modify the treaty after its entry into force) with the contracting states,
thereby giving all signatories a say in future alterations of the agreement. In theory, small
states can pursue an alternative strategy: they can agree to an incomplete contract with a
dominant state, while insisting on assigning residual rights to strong supranational organs
to guarantee the credibility of commitments made. Cooley and Spruyt (2009, p. 175)
argue that American hegemony itself made this strategy unlikely in the North American
context. Not only had ‘Washington signaled strict limits as to how far it would allow its
sovereignty to be curtailed, [but] even if the US had consented to greater delegations to
supranational institutions’, its dominant position would mean that the smaller states could
have little faith that the United States would comply with supranational decisions. In the
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end, American opposition to supranationalism left Canada and Mexico with little choice
but to seek protection through completeness.
Why did the signatories of the Treaty of Rome agree to an incomplete contract with
provisions for supranational institutions? According to Cooley and Spruyt (2009), the
answer once again lies in the distribution of power among states, and the nature of demand
for European integration. In the late-1950s, France and Germany maintained an uneasy
balance of power on the European continent. Germany needed the EU to reconstruct itself
economically and regain political respectability; and France viewed the EU as a means of
monitoring and controlling how a rising Germany would develop. The smaller states of the
Benelux (Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg) also saw benefits; traditionally highly
trade-dependent, they stood to gain from easy access to large neighbouring markets. Thus,
the demand for integration was broad and strong. The small states nonetheless had reason
to worry that France and Germany would seek to use their power to shape the agreement
to their benefit in the future. The three Benelux states could therefore agree to contractual
incompleteness only on the condition that supranational institutions would be created to
safeguard their positions. France (to bind Germany) and Germany (to secure its rehabili-
tation as a ‘normal’ state) supported the creation of the Commission and the Court. For
Cooley and Spruyt (2009, p. 161), the symmetry of power between France and Germany,
and the rise of mutual economic interdependence, led ‘political and social elites’ to
negotiate a treaty that combined ‘a significant degree of supranational decision-making
with relatively low levels of [legal] precision ex ante’.
Cooley and Spruyt also consider the consequences downstream of different types of
contracting. Incomplete contracts that assign residual rights to supranational institutions
create the conditions and incentives for further integration, as extensively shown by
research in the neofunctionalist tradition (Mattli and Slaughter, 1998; Sandholtz and Stone
Sweet, 1998). Relatively complete contracting, by contrast, virtually precludes such
developments.
Cooley and Spruyt’s framework raises several questions that are internal to the
theory. First, does a complete contract actually provide greater assurance to small states
against future abuses by the powerful? Suppose the hegemonic state seeks to change a
treaty ex post. If the small states depend more on access to the market of the hegemon
for their prosperity than the dominant state depends on their markets, the hegemon could
credibly threaten to walk away from the agreement if the small states resist changes.
Similarly, assume that a few small states are desperate for an integration agreement,
while the dominant state is willing only to offer an incomplete contract without supra-
national institutions. Will the small states reject the offer? At present we are unable to
determine whether complete contracts are in fact more robust safeguards than suprana-
tional institutions. Research designed to explore the boundary conditions of the relative
effectiveness of these alternatives is obviously needed. Finally, the Cooley-Spruyt
version of contracting theory can tell us little about how supranational authority is
designed, or how it will operate, without being supplemented by other materials. In EU
studies, delegation theory – based on the adaptation of principal-agent and trusteeship
models to the EU case – has become standard (Majone, 2001; Pollack, 2003; Thatcher
and Stone Sweet, 2002). As neofunctionalists stressed, supranational organs are unlikely
to be effective if they are deprived of continuous contact with private, non-state actors,
and if their decisions can be easily overturned or usurped in other ways. The striking
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effectiveness of the EU’s legal system, for example, derives in large part from its ability
to build transnational alliances with private actors that have a vested interest in market
integration and rights protection (Keleman, in this issue). Such networks make interfer-
ence in judicial proceedings costly even for the most powerful governments, and their
efforts to constrain the Court have been starkly unsuccessful (Stone Sweet and Brunell,
forthcoming). Effective commitment devices can develop in regions characterized by
asymmetries in state power.
II. The European Polity
Integration has produced a complex quasi-federal polity in Europe, but not (yet) else-
where. This raises particular challenges for those seeking to understand the evolution of
the EU – on its own or in comparison with other regional regimes. This special issue takes
up these challenges, two of which we emphasize here. First, as integration has proceeded,
EU institutions have been continuously subject to change, both incrementally, through use
and adaptation, and through rounds of formal negotiation. The second concerns legitimacy
dilemmas, which have become more acute as the impact of the EU on people’s lives has
become more pervasive.
Several of the contributions to this issue reflect what we view as a productive trend in
the social sciences more generally: theories of institutional change have become much less
sectarian and more inclusive methodologically. Scholars now accept that compelling and
fruitful theorizing often necessitates the blending of insights from a variety of theoretical
traditions. Historical institutionalists, for example, have moved to complement models of
path dependence and punctuated equilibrium with elements drawn from traditional power-
distributional theories (Thelen, 2004; Peters et al., 2005; Hall, 2011). In the same spirit,
Jupille et al. (forthcoming) have integrated otherwise disparate accounts of institutional
use, selection and change within a single dynamic analytical framework on institutional
choice. They include power, efficiency and distributional motives as key drivers, and
replace the assumption of synoptic rationality with a more realistic bounded-rationality
assumption favoured by research in sociology and new institutional economics.
We sketch here an expanded version of the traditional demand and supply framework,
the implicit or explicit workhorse in much analysis of institutional change, in order to
locate the contributions to this special issue that explain change in the EU. Demand
focuses on the deep causes of change. These can typically be traced to new technologies
or other exogenous events that weaken the functional fit between an existing governance
structure and the set of co-operation problems that the structure was meant to resolve.
Exogenous events alter the stakes, complexity and intensity of a co-operation problem,
triggering demand for an overhaul of the institutional status quo. Supply focuses on the
actors and procedures involved in shaping the response to this challenge. Because differ-
ent solutions have different distributional implications, the preferences of the actors
negotiating specific modalities of change may vary considerably. In bounded-rationality
contexts, the distributional stakes are often not immediately apparent, which may facilitate
agreement. With use, however, the distributional implications of reform become clear, and
groups whose relative power has weakened will regret having acceded to the agreement.
The supply-side analysis seeks to explain why some groups prevail over others, and why
institutions therefore come to look and operate the way they do.
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The key to a more synthetic approach to supply-side analysis is a more comprehensive
understanding of the sources and implications of bargaining power. We can distinguish
four main sources of power: material and financial; informational and knowledge-based;
normative and ideational; and institutional. Analysts often give primacy to only one
source, ignoring the others, although we know that actors frequently derive power from
multiple sources. Consider, for example, the powers of the justices serving on the ECJ, a
prominent set of actors in many of the studies in this special issue. First, they have great
institutional power: the ECJ is a focal organ of governance, single and uncontested; in
addition, it is supported by a wide range of ‘natural’ clients and allies, including the
Commission, domestic courts and powerful socio-economic groups with a vested interest
in integration. As a result, the depth and breadth of the ECJ’s patronage network’ is
considerable. Second, the ECJ possesses extensive normative and informational power
(Burley and Mattli, 1993). The Court’s duty is to interpret and apply – authoritatively –
EU law, as well as to enforce that law against the Member States, and it does so in their
its own ‘doctrinal’ language. The Court routinely camouflages activist interpretations and
controversial decisions in technical legal garb (Mattli and Slaughter, 1998).
In this special issue, several studies beautifully illustrate the significance of various
sources of power for understanding the supply and evolution of institutions. Rittberger
explains why the European Parliament (EP), an organ possessing few nominal powers at
the outset, developed into a lawmaker on an equal footing with the Council of Ministers
in the legislative process. When the Treaty of Rome was negotiated, the Benelux countries
took the view that their interests could more effectively be protected in an intergovern-
mental Council, where every Member State had veto power, than in a parliamentary body.
A weak EP was the result. How and why did the EP’s legislative role increase? Rittberg-
er’s main proposition is that ‘actors whose preferences are in line with the standard of
legitimacy tend to have superior bargaining power [relative to] . . . actors whose prefer-
ences cannot be easily squared or brought in line with the standard of legitimacy argu-
mentatively’. The introduction of qualified majority voting (a response to the declining
competitiveness of the European economy and enlargement dynamics) meant that any
national government could be outvoted, undermining the capacity of national parliaments
to (indirectly) control EU legislation. Those in favour of a much more substantial EP
(mainly MEPs and a few sympathetic governments) seized on this ‘legitimacy gap’ to
successfully push through an extension of the EP’s powers. Invoking the deeply rooted
legitimacy standards of parliamentarism put opponents on the defensive, maginalizing and
‘shaming’ them as undemocratic.
Heritier’s article nicely complements Rittberger’s account, tracing the striking evolu-
tion of the EP’s role in the comitology system. Many EU statutes are incomplete contracts.
Under the Single Act, the Council routinely delegated to the Commission powers to take
further implementing measures to ‘complete’ them. The Commission does so under rules
known as ‘comitology procedures’. Initially, the EP played no role in the comitology
system. Today the EP shares with the Council the authority to control outcomes produced
by comitology. How did the EP come to gain such influence? Heritier’s account stresses
the role of uncertainty about the impact of institutional choices in a bounded-rationality
context ‘where many actors with diverse preferences are involved’. The introduction of
co-decision legislative procedures (the Maastricht Treaty) gave the EP, in effect, a veto
over legislation. The EP learned to leverage the veto in order to gain oversight authority
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over the comitology process; it could make approval of EU statutes contingent on the
acceptance of its demands to exercise oversight functions. The EP thus succeeded in
incrementally carving out a significant new role in an area of institutional design that the
Maastricht Treaty had not foreseen.
Kelemen discusses another fascinating transformation: the rise of judicialized gover-
nance in the EU. Eurolegalism replaces more informal and opaque approaches to regu-
lation at the national level with EU regulatory regimes that are characterized by formality,
transparency, adversarial approaches to enforcement and judicial review. The judiciary
stands out as a key engine of this transformation. As Keleman argues:
[T]he ECJ, given its institutional self-interest as a court and its consistent preference for
promoting deeper European integration, has embraced this mode of governance more
than any EU institution. EU policy makers have invited the ECJ and national courts to
play an important role in regulation, but the ECJ has seized on this opportunity and
promoted judicialization to an extent that other policy makers did not anticipate.
As noted above, this proposition is consistent with neofunctionalist analysis, and it
focuses our attention on the importance of judges in interpreting and enforcing incomplete
contracts.2
In his article on the development of the principle of subsidiarity, Craig draws on similar
concepts. The subsidiarity principle was enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty and reinforced
in the Lisbon Treaty. It lays down the rule that if the desired regulatory or policy objective
could be ‘sufficiently’ achieved at the national level, then it is incumbent on the EC to
show that the objective could be ‘better’ accomplished at the Community level. For
reasons that each of the three approaches to CRI surveyed in the previous section would
predict, the Member States have neither been able to delineate, in a stable way, the
respective spheres of authority of the EU and the Member States, nor to curtail the
‘creeping competences’ of the former (Pollack, 1994; Swendon, 2004). The subsidiarity
principle means to respond to both problems. As Craig puts it, ‘the “S” word [subsidiarity]
in the Maastricht Treaty was . . . important in allaying fears about the “F” word,
federalism’.
Strikingly, Craig finds that in the twenty years since the Maastricht Treaty – a period
during which thousands of regulations, directives and decisions were passed – fewer than
a dozen legal challenges based on subsidiarity have been brought. Why so few? The key
reasons accord with neofunctionalist insights. First, many powerful private actors oppose
a robust application of subsidiarity on efficiency grounds. To leave substantive aspects of
the regulatory regime or enforcement to national governments risks creating regulatory
diversity (for example, in health and safety), raising uncertainty and costs for producers
and traders. These groups are likely to pressure governments against subsidiary chal-
lenges, as well as to urge the Commission and ECJ to plug gaps and fix inconsistencies in
regulation and enforcement. Insofar as they are successful, the level of EC control and
oversight will be ratcheted up. Second, diverging Member State preferences undermine
European governments’ ability to resist ongoing EC empowerment. ‘In assessing the
2 The implications of the analyses of Rittberger, Héritier and Kelemen for CRI scholarship are straightforward: insofar as
regional integration maintains strictly intergovernmental decision-making rules, there is little scope for the kind of
institutional transformation that the EU has recurrently undergone.
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judicial record,’ Craig argues, ‘it is important to recognize that in a number of . . . cases
the subsidiarity challenge was opposed by other Member States.’
Eichengreen’s study provides a particularly timely illustration of the key role played by
politics in institutional analysis. The article charts some of the major changes in European
governance in response to the global financial meltdown and the euro-crisis, including the
European Stability Mechanism (ESM). His investigation makes crystal clear that theories
of institutional choice based on economic factors alone are bound to be inadequate in that
they miss the supply-side. What is crucial, he notes, is ‘the bargaining not just among
national governments but also among interest groups within individual Member States’,
dynamics that are not well captured by ‘the simple median voter model used [by econo-
mists] . . . to analyze the conduct of policy in Europe’s monetary union’. Economic crisis
created the demand, but supply-side politics will determine the final shape of the response
and the accompanying institutional reform. Eichengreen shows that such supply-side
politics blocked much-needed moves to fiscal federalism at the EU level in the 1990s, and
predicts that they will continue to prevent it from emerging in the foreseeable future.
A second theme of this special issue concerns the socio-political legitimacy of the EU.
In their contributions, Hobolt, De Wilde and Zürn, and Mény suggest that the ‘permissive
consensus’ – claimed to have enabled an elite-driven, relatively depoliticized integration
process to succeed through the 1980s – has been destroyed (Hooghe and Marks, 2009).
Haas and his associates had predicted that successful integration would inevitably impli-
cate issues of citizenship and identity (see also Fligstein et al.; De Wilde and Zürn). So it
has come to pass. Today not only do scholars and publics evaluate the functioning and
output of the EU as a state-like polity, but political parties, opinion-makers and social
movements are increasingly mobilized on EU issues.
The articles by Rittberger and Kelemen explicitly address the political legitimacy,
respectively, of the EU’s legislative process and the legal system. Rittberger charts the
process through which ‘representative democracy’, in the guise of a strong EP, ‘assumed
the status of a constitutional principle’. Member State governments, once strongly
opposed to the principle, gradually acceded to it, even for matters with ‘far-reaching
[distributive] implications’. Kelemen shows that the judicialization of the EU has changed
how democracy functions. In a mass of legislation adopted since the Single Act (1986), the
Council of Ministers routinely enlisted the judiciary to help resolve the acute commitment
problems of governing a decentralized, institutionally fragmented polity. Judicial author-
ity, too, rests on templates of democratic legitimacy that are difficult for opponents to
impugn (see Mény), including those associated with rights protection, access to justice
and procedural transparency. The Rittberger and Kelemen articles comprise a powerful
response to the assertion that the EU is afflicted with an acute democratic deficit that is
incapable of being mitigated. As important, the probability that these outcomes will be
reversed must be close to zero.
Is there a democratic deficit in the EU? Hobolt tackles this thorny question in a
nuanced, state-of-the-art analysis of the public’s ‘satisfaction with democracy’. Overall,
the majority of Europeans are satisfied with democracy in the EU – indeed, more so than
they are ‘with democracy in their own country’ – though she finds wide cross-national
variation. Relatively low levels of satisfaction with the EU are not explained by higher
levels of confidence in national institutions; moreover, Hobolt ‘found no evidence that
economic growth or financial transfers [in themselves] boost satisfaction’. Instead, how
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citizens evaluate the representational and procedural aspects of EU democracy is crucial.
Her conclusion, that the future of the public’s views on the EU will depend on how well
the regime is able ‘to breed confidence in its democratic institutions’, deserves to be
considered in light of the research by Rittberger and Kelemen.
Two studies examine the politicization of the EU in detail. Fligstein et al. find support
for theorists who predicted that a European identity would emerge among those who
engage in transnational commerce and society, joined by other cosmopolitans. In 2010, a
majority of people ‘claimed a European identity at least some of the time’. National
identity not only remains strong, but it is increasingly being defined, by a small but
growing segment of the population, in opposition to immigration and to the EU. The
outcome of a looming battle between the ‘winners’ of integration, who are heavily
invested in the EU, and the ‘losers’, who are now partly organized into right-wing parties
in the defence of insular nationalism, will partly determine the future.
In a complementary article, De Wilde and Zürn conceive politicization as a conse-
quence of developments taking place since the Single Act of 1986. The more the EU
impacts on national politics, they argue, the more integration will generate ‘political
mobilization and contestation’. As integration has proceeded, the EU’s supranational
institutions have been reconfigured to enhance the participation of individuals and orga-
nized interests (Héritier, Rittberger, Kelemen). At the national level, however, govern-
ments have sought to limit citizen involvement and contestation, especially after the
failure to adopt an EU Constitution. De Wilde and Zürn argue that European integration
has now gone too far for a strategy of ‘depoliticization’ to succeed.
Finally, Yves Mény, a long-time observer of and participant in EU affairs, offers
concluding comments. He is gloomy about the current state of the Union, and pessimistic
about its future. In moving beyond the goal of achieving a Common Market, the integra-
tion process has generated a number of intractable governance problems: the turn to
Eurolegalism has not been counterbalanced by broadening citizen participation; the Com-
mission remains dominated by an insular approach to consultation with affected interests;
and the domain of national regulatory capacity and autonomy has steadily shrunk, while
political representation and electoral politics remain stubbornly national. The current
budgetary and monetary crisis shines a bright light on these problems (Eichengreen,
Fligstein et al.), while revealing the striking absence of what Europe needs most: strong
political leadership capable of forging a more federal EU. Although the regime has proved
to be remarkably resilient in the face of past crises, Mény’s cri de coeur reminds us again
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